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Reciprocity is firmly established as an important mechanism that promotes cooperation. An efficient
information exchange is likewise important, especially on structured populations, where interactions between
players are limited. Motivated by these two facts, we explore the role of facilitators in social dilemmas on networks.
Facilitators are here mirrors to their neighbors—they cooperate with cooperators and defect with defectors—but
they do not participate in the exchange of strategies. As such, in addition to introducing direct reciprocity, they
also obstruct information exchange. In well-mixed populations, facilitators favor the replacement and invasion
of defection by cooperation as long as their number exceeds a critical value. In structured populations, on the
other hand, there exists a delicate balance between the benefits of reciprocity and the deterioration of information
exchange. Extensive Monte Carlo simulations of social dilemmas on various interaction networks reveal that
there exists an optimal interplay between reciprocity and information exchange, which sets in only when a small
number of facilitators occupy the main hubs of the scale-free network. The drawbacks of missing cooperative
hubs are more than compensated for by reciprocity and, at the same time, the compromised information exchange
is routed via the auxiliary hubs with only marginal losses in effectivity. These results indicate that it is not always
optimal for the main hubs to become leaders of the masses, but rather to exploit their highly connected state to
promote tit-for-tat-like behavior.
DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevE.89.042802 PACS number(s): 89.75.Fb, 87.23.Ge, 87.23.Kg
I. INTRODUCTION
Unraveling the mechanisms at the origin of cooperation
and understanding the reasons for so much biological diversity
are among the most important challenges to Darwin’s natural
selection theory. For instance, it has been found that tropical
forests and coral reefs teem with biological variation and there
are also many examples of insects that coordinate their efforts
and even give up their own reproductive potential (fitness)
to benefit that of the “queen” [1]. Other examples include
micro-organisms that can join forces to form biofilms and
humans who are able to be “supercooperators” [2,3].
If only the fittest individuals survive and reproduce [4],
why is there so much diversity in nature [5]? What are
the mechanisms that originate and maintain cooperative
behavior? Evolutionary game theory (EGT) addresses these
questions by means of simple but insightful models in which
each individual’s fitness varies and depends on the others’
reproductive potential [6–8]. Evolutionary game theory is the
natural framework to mathematically study the dynamics of
competing strategies (species) and the above fundamental
questions have motivated a large body of work. In the context
of EGT, understanding the evolution of cooperation often leads
to a social dilemma, such as in the paradigmatic prisoner’s
dilemma game [9], where each rational individual chooses to
defect (i.e., not to cooperate) while it would be in everyone’s
interest to cooperate. Cooperation dilemmas also arise in
other EGT models such as the snowdrift and stag-hunt games
[10,11].
Among the mechanisms that have been put forward to pos-
sibly explain the spread of cooperation, the influence of kin and
group selection, as well as various forms of reciprocity (direct,
indirect, and network reciprocity), have been investigated;
see, e.g., Refs. [12–17]. In particular, network reciprocity
[11,18–20], whose principle has an appealing physical inter-
pretation (cooperators are better off when they are surrounded
by cooperators), has recently attracted interest in the physics
community [21–33]. Quite interestingly, it has been found that,
in contrast to what happens in spatially homogeneous (well-
mixed) populations, the arrangement of individuals according
to certain topologies can lead to very different scenarios. For
instance, it was found that local interactions on regular lattices
enhance the survival of cooperators in prisoner’s dilemma
games but inhibit their resistance against the invasion by
defectors in snowdrift games [14,16].
Recently, the promotion of cooperation in the presence of
cooperation facilitators has been investigated [34–36]. These
are special individuals who interact with competing players
by mirroring their strategies, but they do not participate in
the strategy exchange process. More precisely, they cooperate
with cooperators and defect with defectors, but their status
never changes over time, as they never adopt the strategy
of another player. The influence of cooperation facilitators
has been studied for the prisoner’s dilemma, snowdrift, and
stag-hunt games in spatially homogeneous populations. In
such a setting, the mean field analysis and the cooperation
fixation probability reveal that the invasion and replacement
of defection by cooperation is favored when the number of
facilitators exceeds a nontrivial critical value. When players
are distributed over a structured population, however, we may
face additional, competing effects. This is not only because
each player has a limited interaction neighborhood, but also
because facilitators, who do not participate in the strategy
exchange process, can hinder the spread of information and
so decelerate or even stop the invasion of the more successful
strategy.
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To clarify the impact of these effects, we consider evolu-
tionary games where competing strategies and facilitators are
interpreted as species of a spatially structured population. The
fundamental question we aim to address is how the enhanced
reciprocity on the one hand and the limited information
exchange on the other hand interplay due to the presence
of facilitators. To this end, we investigate the influence of
facilitators (here, individuals facilitating either cooperators or
defectors; see below) on a class of two-strategy games when
individuals interact with their neighbors on a network. We
specifically consider the cases of two-dimensional lattices and
degree-homogeneous random graphs, as well as (heteroge-
neous) scale-free networks.
The organization of this paper is as follows. The models
of social dilemmas with facilitators are introduced in Sec. II
and the main properties of the nonspatial prisoner’s dilemma
game with facilitators are outlined in Sec. III. Numerical
results for the level of cooperation in evolutionary games
with facilitators on structured populations are presented and
discussed in Secs. IV and V.
II. SOCIAL DILEMMAS WITH FACILITATORS
We study pairwise evolutionary games on the square lattice,
the random regular (degree-homogeneous) graph, and the
Baraba´si-Albert scale-free network [37], each with an average
degree k = 4 and size N . Mutual cooperation yields the
reward R, mutual defection leads to punishment P , and
the mixed choice gives the cooperator the sucker’s payoff
S and the defector the temptation T . Within this setup we
have the prisoner’s dilemma game if T > R > P > S, the
snowdrift game if T > R > S > P , and the stag-hunt game if
R > T > P > S, thus covering all three major social dilemma
types. Without loss of generality and for the sake of clarity, we
set R = 1, P = 0, 0  T  2, and−1  S  1, as illustrated
in Fig. 1. We note that the T < 1 and S > 0 quadrant marks
the harmony game, which, however, does not constitute a
social dilemma. To further reduce the dimensionality of the
parameter space, we introduce T = 1+ r and S = −r , where
−1  r  1 constitutes a diagonal across the T -S plane that
splits the harmony game and the prisoner’s dilemma quadrant
in half. Note that for r < 0 we are in the harmony game
quadrant, while for r > 0 we are in the prisoner’s dilemma
quadrant. This parametrization of the prisoner’s dilemma game
is the most challenging for the evolution of cooperation and it
is sometimes referred to as the donation game [38].
Initially, in addition to the cooperators C and defectors D
who are distributed uniformly at random in equal proportion,
we designate a fraction ρF of players as facilitators F .
Facilitators behave like mirrors to their neighbors, true to
the most elementary form of reciprocity. A facilitator will
cooperate with a cooperator and defect with a defector.
However, facilitators do not accumulate payoffs and do not
participate in the exchange of strategies.1 This means that
facilitators cannot be overtaken by other players and also
cannot spread. Accordingly, the fraction ρF remains constant
1In Ref. [35], only facilitators cooperating with cooperators were
considered.
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FIG. 1. (Color online) Evolution of cooperation with and without
facilitators on the square lattice. Depicted is the rescaled stationary
fraction of cooperators ρC on the whole T -S parameter plane, as
obtained in the absence of facilitators (red dotted lines) and with
ρF = 0.05 (green solid lines). It can be observed that facilitators
do not change the qualitative properties of the solutions, but their
presence does shift the survival barrier of cooperators towards harsher
conditions, especially in the prisoner’s dilemma quadrant (see the
text). Here HG denotes the harmony game, SD denotes the snowdrift
game, SH denotes the stag-hunt game, and PD denotes the prisoner’s
dilemma game.
throughout the evolutionary process and their positions on the
network do not change. Within this setup, we seek to determine
the optimal fraction of facilitators, as well as their impact on
each particular social dilemma type.
We simulate the evolutionary process in accordance with
the standard Monte Carlo simulation procedure comprising the
following elementary steps. Among the subset of cooperators
and defectors on the network, a randomly selected player
x acquires its payoff Px by playing the game with all its
neighbors. Next, player x randomly chooses one (also a
nonfacilitator) neighbor y, who then also acquires its payoffPy
in the same way as previously player x. Finally, player x adopts
the strategy sy from player y with a probability determined by
the Fermi function
W (sy → sx) = 11+ exp[(Px − Py)/K]
, (1)
where K = 0.1 quantifies the uncertainty related to the
strategy adoption process [11]. Note that K can be interpreted
as being proportional to the selection intensity (see, e.g., [7]).
In agreement with previous works, the selected value ensures
that better-performing players are readily followed by their
neighbors, although adopting the strategy of a player that
performs worse is not impossible either [39,40]. This accounts
for imperfect information, errors in the evaluation of the
opponent, and similar unpredictable factors. We note, however,
that qualitatively identical behavior can be observed for other
finite values of K where the stochastic imitation dynamics
remains non-neutral. Each full Monte Carlo step gives a
chance for every player to change its strategy once on average.
All simulation results are obtained on networks with N =
104–(2× 105) players or more (including the facilitators),
depending on the proximity to phase transition points, and
the fraction of cooperators ρC is determined in the stationary
state after a sufficiently long relaxation (up to 2× 105 Monte
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Carlo steps). To further improve accuracy, the final results are
averaged over up to 100 independent runs where interaction
networks were generated 50 times for random and scale-free
graphs at each set of parameter values.
III. NONSPATIAL PRISONER’S DILEMMA
WITH FACILITATORS
To better appreciate the influence of topology on social
dilemmas in the presence of facilitators, it is useful to outline
the properties of the prisoner’s dilemma with facilitators in
the mean field setting and on a complete graph [34,35]. In
this section we focus on the prisoner’s dilemma whose payoff
matrix has entries T for temptation (with 1 < T  2), R =
1 for mutual defection, P = 0 for punishment, and S (with
−1  S < 0) as the sucker’s payoff and assume T + S  1.
In the mean field and complete graph settings, the pop-
ulation structure is homogeneous (well mixed) and space
therefore does not matter: Any individual can interact with
all the others. In a homogeneous population of size N ,
consisting of j = NρC cooperators, k = NρD defectors, and
ℓ = NρF facilitators, the expected payoff of a cooperator
is therefore Cj =
j+ℓ−1
N−1 + S
k
N−1 and for a defector it is
Dj = T
j
N−1 (self-interactions have been omitted). It is useful
to introduce the payoff difference of competing strategies
j = 
D
j −
C
j , as it is then easy to see that the difference
consists of two terms j = α(j/N )+ β, where the first
cooperator-dependent term contains α = ( N
N−1 )(T + S − 1)
while the fixed second term β = 1−S(N−ℓ)−ℓ
N−1 depends only on
the fraction of facilitators.
A. Mean field limit
The mean field (MF) limit corresponds to a spatially
homogeneous population of infinite size N →∞. In this
situation, the dynamics of the prisoner’s dilemma with
facilitators is described by a replicatorlike equation for the
density ρC = j/N of cooperators [7,10,41–44]. Here, since
the underlying dynamics is implemented with the Fermi rule
(1), such an equation reads [34,35]
dρC
dt
= −ρC(1− ρC − ρF ) tanh
(
αρC + β
2K
)
, (2)
where in the MF limit α = T + S − 1  0 and β = (S −
1)ρF − S. The analysis of (2) readily reveals three distinct
behaviors depending on the fraction of facilitators ρF .
(i) When ρF  S/(S − 1) ≡ ρ˜F , defection is still the
dominant strategy and the population evolves towards ρC = 0
and ρD = 1− ρF (only attractor).
(ii) On the other hand, when ρ˜F < ρF < 1− T −1 and T +
S > 1 the only attractor of (2) is ρ∗C = −β/α = S+(1−S)ρFT+S−1 .
There is a stable coexistence of cooperators and defectors.
(iii) When ρF > 1− T −1 and T + S > 1, cooperation is
the dominant strategy and the dynamics approaches ρC = 1−
ρF and ρD = 0.
It is worth noting that Eq. (2) has no coexistence steady
state when T + S = 1 (since α = 0). The MF dynamics
along such a special line reproduces the behaviors (i) and
(iii): ρC = 1− ρF is stable when ρF > ρ˜F (since β > 0) and
unstable otherwise, with ρC = 0 being the only attractor when
ρF < ρ˜F .
B. Case of complete graphs (N < ∞)
When the population is well mixed and of finite size
N <∞, its evolution is usually described in terms of a
birth-and-death Markov chain with absorbing boundaries
[7,34,35,44]. In this case, the fixation of either defection
(ρC = 0) or cooperation (ρC = 1− ρF ) is guaranteed. On
complete graphs, the dynamics is implemented as a Markov
chain with rates
T ±j =
j (N − ℓ− j )
N (N − 1) [1+ e
±(αj+Nβ)/NK ]−1
for the transitions j → j ± 1.
Since fluctuations prevent stable coexistence when N <
∞, it is important to understand when cooperation is favored
by selection. The following conditions have been proposed
[7,45]: (a) the invasion by cooperators is favored when1 <
0 and (b) selection favors the replacement of defection by
cooperation when (N − ℓ)φC > 1, where
φC =
[
1+
N−ℓ−1∑
n=1
exp
(
n
2NK
[α(n+ 1)+ 2Nβ]
)]−1
is the fixation probability of a single cooperator [35].
When N ≫ ℓ, the invasion condition (1) is satisfied when
ρF > ρ˜F , while the replacement condition (2) reads
N − ℓ >
N−ℓ∑
n=1
exp
[
αn
K
(
n
2N
+
β
α
)]
(3)
and is satisfied when ρF > ρ∗F , where ρ∗F is a critical value
obtained by equating both sides of (3). It has been found that
ρ∗F  ρ˜F when T + S > 1 and ρ∗F  ρ˜F otherwise (with ρ∗F =
ρ˜F when T + S = 1) [35].
In summary, in the MF limit cooperators and defectors
coexist when the fraction of facilitator ρF exceeds the critical
value ρ˜F = S/(S − 1) and T + S  1, whereas cooperation is
favored on complete graphs when ρF is above a critical value
ρ∗F  ρ˜F .
IV. RESULTS ON NETWORKS
We begin by studying the impact of facilitators on the
square lattice with periodic boundary conditions. The results
are summarized in Fig. 1. For a comprehensive insight, we
compare the outcomes of the evolutionary process on the
whole T -S parameter plane, as obtained with and without
facilitators. To allow for a better comparison of the influence
of facilitators, in Fig. 1 and in the other figures we report
the relative density of cooperators obtained by rescaling the
physical fraction of cooperators present in the population by
(1− ρF )−1, i.e., we have rescaled ρC → ρC/(1− ρF ) so that
in all the figures its value always ranges between 0 and 1. The
presented results indicate that the impact of facilitators can
be considered as a second-order effect. While the results do
not change qualitatively, the survival threshold of cooperators
shifts considerably towards harsher conditions. This is most
pronounced in the prisoner’s dilemma quadrant, although
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quantitative changes are observable in the snowdrift and the
stag-hunt quadrant as well. Facilitators exercise a second-order
effect because the outcome is primarily determined by the
fact that the evolutionary games are staged on a structured
population (in this case the square lattice). The spatiality
of interactions always allows cooperators and defectors to
coexist in a special parameter interval while the presence
of facilitators shifts the borders of different stable solutions.
This behavior is significantly different from the nonspatial
behavior of evolutionary games with facilitators outlined in
the previous section, where their presence can radically change
the character of solutions and the type of social dilemma. In
Fig. 1 we also notice that nothing uncharacteristic happens
along the line T + S = 1. Henceforth, we will characterize
the comprehensive properties of the evolutionary games on
networks by conveniently focusing on the parametrization
T = 1+ r,S = −r , with −1  r  1. This parametrization
constitutes a diagonal across the prisoner’s dilemma and
harmony game quadrants.
Next we explore how the topology of the interaction
network affects the impact of facilitators. To avoid effects
stemming from the heterogeneity of the interaction network,
we first compare the outcomes obtained on the square lattice
and the random regular (degree-homogeneous) graph. On both
these networks every player has four neighbors (k = 4). As
Fig. 2 shows, the principal impact of facilitators is to widen
the parameter range whereC andD players coexist. Moreover,
increasing ρF increases the fraction of cooperators within
this interval and, as expected, contributes to a higher level
of cooperation in the population. However, if the fraction
of facilitators becomes too high, typically ρF > 0.4, then
facilitators will no longer play solely the role of mirrors to
their neighbors, but they will also serve as “walls” that prevent
efficient information spreading throughout the system. At this
point, it is worth reiterating that facilitators do not participate
actively in the evolutionary process. Consequently, too many
facilitators will separate competing strategies and there will
be segregation with the population splitting apart into smaller
fragments. Within these small and effectively isolated regions,
the parametrization of the game, and thus the type of social
dilemma, no longer plays a decisive role for the survival of
the two competing strategies. Effectively, a “dilemma hiding”
effect sets in, where the prevailing configuration is determined
by the local initial conditions and remains frozen afterwards.
This means that, after a very short initial period, the strategies
can no longer evolve according to the dynamics that would be
dictated by the payoff elements. The ultimate consequence
of the dilemma hiding effect is that, within the locally
frozen states, some cooperators may survive even at the most
demanding conditions that constitute a prisoner’s dilemma
(r = 1) and, vice versa, some defectors may survive even
at the most lenient conditions that characterize the harmony
game (r = −1). Two representative snapshots depicting such
an evolutionary outcome are presented in Fig. 3.
It is also worth comparing the results obtained on random
graphs with degree k = 4 and the predictions obtained for
complete graphs where the degree is equal to N : On the latter,
at a fixed value of ρF , we have shown that cooperation prevails
when r < ρF /(1− ρF ). On the other hand, if the node degree
is 4 then ρC ≈ 1 when r  0 while ρC ≈ 0 when r  3ρF . The
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Impact of facilitators on (a) the square
lattice and (b) the random regular graph. Depicted is the stationary
fraction of cooperators ρC in dependence on r , as obtained for
different fractions of facilitators occupying the network (see figure
legend for the values of ρF ). Due to the qualitatively identical results
obtained on the two networks, it can be concluded that the topology of
the interaction network does not play a notable role. More precisely,
if the network remains degree homogeneous, then the randomness of
interactions yields the same results as lattice-type models.
comparison of the critical facilitator density with the results
of numerical simulations for the random regular graphs with
k = 4 in Fig. 4 reveals that the critical threshold on the latter
is always below the mean field prediction ρ˜F . This indicates
that fewer facilitators are needed on a random regular graph
with a finite degree than on a complete graph for cooperation
to prevail.
So far, we have considered only homogeneous interaction
networks, where the distribution of facilitators was always
uniformly random and the specific placement did not matter
because all players on the square lattice and the random
regular graph have the same degree. This changes if instead we
apply heterogeneous interaction graphs, such as the scale-free
networks, where the distribution of degree is a power law.
We use the algorithm proposed by Baraba´si and Albert [37]
to construct scale-free networks with the average degree
k = 4 and degree distributionPk ∼ k−3 [Baraba´si-Albert (BA)
graphs] and we consider four different cases of where on the
network to place facilitators. First, to keep the analogy with
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FIG. 3. (Color online) Characteristic distributions of cooperators
[dark gray (blue)] and defectors [light gray (red)] on the L× L =
100× 100 square lattice, as obtained for r = −1 (left) and r = 1
(right) if the fraction of facilitators (gray) is sufficiently high for them
to split the population in effectively isolated smaller fragments. The
left panel depicts the outcome of the most lenient harmony game,
yet still some defectors are able to survive. On the contrary, the right
panel depicts the outcome of the harshest prisoner’s dilemma game,
yet cooperators survive. In both panels the fraction of facilitators is
ρF = 0.5.
the previous treatment on homogeneous networks, we choose
players uniformly at random regardless of their degree. As
results presented in Fig. 5(a) illustrate, increasing ρF will not
just increase ρC , but also expand gradually the coexistence
region significantly toward stronger social dilemmas (higher
values of r).
Naturally, we could also observe the dilemma hiding effect
for sufficiently high values of ρF (now shown), which for
the considered scale-free network and randomly distributed
facilitators begins atρF ≈ 0.5. If, on the other hand, facilitators
are placed on low- or intermediate-degree nodes, the dilemma
 0.0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0  0.2  0.4  0.6  0.8  1
ρ F
r
FIG. 4. (Color online) Minimal fraction of facilitators that is
necessary to avoid the tragedy of the commons (the pure D state)
as a function of r = T − 1 for the prisoner’s dilemma: Cooperation
becomes viable above this threshold. Comparison of the mean field
prediction ρ˜F = r/(1+ r) (dotted line) with the value obtained by
numerical simulations on random graphs with regular degree 4
(symbols). When the degree increases, the symbols would move
towards the mean field line (not shown here). See also the main
text for details.
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FIG. 5. (Color online) Impact of facilitators on the scale-free
network (a) if their placement is uniformly random regardless of the
degree of players or if their placement is limited to players with (b)
low or (c) intermediate degree. Depicted is the stationary fraction of
cooperators ρC in dependence on r , as obtained for different fractions
of facilitators occupying the network (see the legend for the values
of ρF ). As in Fig. 2, increasing the value of ρF will significantly
extend the region where cooperators and defectors are able to coexist,
especially if the facilitators are placed randomly (a). The results are
obtained using N = 105 system size (see the text).
hiding effect appears only at even larger values of ρF . This is
understandable since low-degree nodes have a lower number
of links to the other players and hence disabling their ability
to transfer information obviously has a lesser impact than if
one of the network hubs would lose this ability. In terms of the
impact of facilitators on the evolution of cooperation, however,
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placing facilitators on low- or intermediate-degree nodes has
qualitatively the same impact as placing them randomly across
the whole network. As evidenced by the results presented in
Figs. 5(b) and 5(c), the only difference is that the shift of the
border where both strategies can coexist is obviously smaller
if facilitators occupy low-degree nodes and slightly larger if
facilitators occupy intermediate-degree nodes. The shift is the
largest if the placement of facilitators is uniformly random
regardless of the degree of players, presumably because some
facilitators then also occupy the hubs of the network.
Studying the impact of facilitators targeted on high-degree
nodes will resolve this ambiguity, but before presenting the
results, it is worth emphasizing that the expectations are rather
conflicting for this particular case. On the one hand, we may
hope that placing the facilitators on the hubs will improve
the cooperation level even further because their special status
can enhance network reciprocity (this hope is also justified by
the preceding results presented in Fig. 5). On the other hand,
it is precisely this special position of facilitators that brings
this expectation into questioning. As demonstrated in several
previous works [11,21,46], hubs of scale-free networks play a
crucial role in ensuring highly cooperative states under adverse
conditions. Only the cooperative hubs can reap long-term
benefits from their highly connected status and thus serve
as a lucid reminder of the benefits of cooperative behavior.
However, if we place facilitators on the hubs, then this
mechanism can no longer work. Effectively, we remove the
cooperative leaders and replace them with “mirrors” instead.
We emphasize again that here facilitators cannot be followed,
i.e., they just exactly reciprocate the strategy of each of their
neighbors. Consequently, the level of cooperation may drop
back to the level we observe on homogeneous networks.
Another drawback of placing facilitators on the hubs is the
hindering of the information flow through the system, which
in this case is particularly effective and can thus easily evoke
the dilemma hiding effect demonstrated in Fig. 3.
All these arguments make the results presented in Fig. 6,
which were obtained by placing facilitators on the high-degree
nodes of the BA scale-free network, especially interesting.
These results partly fulfill our expectations outlined in the
previous paragraph, but there are also some unexpected
outcomes. More precisely, the dilemma hiding effect emerges
at rather small ρF values. If the top 5% of nodes are occupied
by facilitators, for instance, then we can observe cooperators
surviving even at the highest r value, but some defectors prevail
in the harmony game region (r < 0) as well, thus indicating an
imperfect information flow. This effect is even more evident
at higher densities of facilitators. However, if only the top
1% of nodes host facilitators, then the information exchange
remains practically flawless, but at the same time a significant
improvement in cooperation level due to active reciprocity
can be observed too. Here the region of near complete
cooperation dominance is extended toward significantly higher
r values (shifted from rc ≈ −0.15 to rc ≈ 0.2), which is
surprising because players cannot imitate the main hubs.
Still, some prominently placed facilitators (mirrors) are able
to not just compensate the impaired learning process, but
even promote cooperation more efficiently than a flawless
learning process would do. Naturally, in this case too the
spreading of cooperative behavior happens predominantly via
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FIG. 6. (Color online) Impact of facilitators on the BA scale-free
network if their placement is limited to players with high degree.
Depicted is the stationary fraction of cooperators ρC in dependence
on r , as obtained for different fractions of facilitators occupying the
targeted high-degree nodes (see the legend for the values of ρF placed
at the most connected nodes). These results reveal the existence of
the optimal interplay between information exchange and reciprocity
(see the main text for details). Compared to the results presented in
Fig. 5, only in this particular case is it possible to combine the two
effects to arrive at the best conditions for widespread cooperation.
The results are obtained using N = 105 system size.
learning, but not through the most obvious channels—via
the strongest hubs—but rather via the slightly less dominant
nodes of the scale-free networks. More precisely, indirect
connections between less preferred players around the hubs
still work, which enables the spreading of the most successful
strategy. At the same time, the advantages of cooperation are
massively amplified by facilitators, which introduce direct
reciprocity that pays more than undisturbed learning. It is
also worth mentioning that the results presented here for BA
graphs are expected to hold for scale-free networks of degree
distribution Pk ∼ k−γ with 1 < γ  3 that are characterized
by high-degree nodes, while we expect to recover the random
degree-homogeneous scenario when γ > 3 (hubs are then
unlikely).
V. DISCUSSION
We have studied the role of facilitators on structured
populations. Facilitators are the ideal mirror to their neighbors
and as such they introduce reciprocity directly to the studied
evolutionary games. Results obtained for well-mixed popula-
tions show that facilitators favor the evolution of cooperation
as long as they are sufficiently present in the population.
Importantly, there are no negative consequences even if their
numbers become large. On structured populations this no
longer holds because in addition to reciprocity, facilitators
also obstruct information exchange. Here facilitators cooperate
with cooperators and defect with defectors, but they do not
participate in the exchange of strategies, meaning that they
cannot be overtaken by other players and they also cannot
spread. Accordingly, we have shown that if the facilitators are
too many, they no longer play solely the role of mirrors to
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their neighbors, but they also act as walls that prevent efficient
information spreading throughout the system. These walls sep-
arate competing strategies and compartmentalize the popul-
ation into effectively isolated regions. Within these regions
the type of social dilemma no longer plays a decisive role for
the survival of the two competing strategies and effectively a
dilemma hiding effect sets in. Only if the fraction of facilitators
is sufficiently small is the evolution of cooperation promoted,
in particular by extending the survival region of cooperators
towards harsher conditions. Besides homogeneous networks
such as the square lattice and the random regular graph, we
have also considered heterogeneous interaction networks—
the most representative being the Baraba´si-Albert scale-free
network—where the placement of facilitators plays a decisive
role. If the facilitators occupied the main hubs of the network,
we were able to observe the optimal interplay between the
benefits of reciprocity and the drawbacks of hindered informa-
tion exchange. This result is highly counterintuitive because
previous research has strongly emphasized the crucial role of
cooperative hubs for the successful evolution of cooperation
[11,21,46]. According to previously established reasoning,
hubs are able influence their large neighborhoods directly,
which yields large homogeneous domains and thus facilitates
the manifestation of long-term benefits of cooperation. Here
we have found that hubs can work even better in favor of
cooperative behavior if they are not used as leaders of the
masses, but rather as mirrors to their many neighbors. As an
avenue to explore in the future, it could be interesting to study
how the results on heterogeneous graphs might change if we
apply different degree distributions of nodes. If we decrease
the number of hubs, for example, then the results may tend
towards those we have obtained on regular graphs where there
are no distinguished players.
Summarizing, we have shown that reciprocity outperforms
imitation via learning and that the latter can still be rerouted
effectively enough through the auxiliary hubs. This delicate
balance between augmented reciprocity and information ex-
change proves to be the best combination that is able to
maintain cooperation even for the most adverse conditions
while at the same time disallowing widespread defection at
lenient conditions. Interestingly, it could be better to promote
tit-for-tat-like behavior in prominent players rather than for
them to aspire towards leader-follower relations.
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